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Abstract Coexistence theory (CT) in community ecology
provides a functional perspective on how multiple competing
species coexist. Here, I explore CT’s usefulness for under-
standing conflict and coexistence among human groups with
diverse livelihood interests in shared resources such as fisher-
ies. I add three concepts from social science research on coex-
istence: adaptability, pluralism, and equity and apply this ex-
panded theoretical framework to the case of salmon fisheries
inAlaska’s Cook Inlet, synthesizing catch records with anthro-
pological research. The analysis addresses issues of inequity,
such as who bears the costs of conservationmeasures, a lack of
pluralism, in that people have come to devalue their neighbors,
and a decline in resilience for some sectors, all of which un-
dermine the likelihood of these groups continuing coexistence.
I discuss policy options for addressing escalating conflict in
the region, such as improving equity in management and the
resilience of some fishing groups to temporary closures. Final-
ly, I discuss points of engagement for CT with other areas of
sustainability science such as resilience thinking.
Keywords Coexistence .Commonpool resources .Conflict .
Fisheries . Resilience . Sustainability . Alaska
Introduction
In any community there are invariably multiple groups that
hold different values and priorities for ecosystems and the
many services that they provide. Often, these conflict: differ-
ent user groups in a shared fishery, for example, often dispute
the fairness and wisdom of allocations, quotas, and other ac-
tions taken to ensure the sustainability of the resource (Hilborn
2007; Pomeroy et al. 2007; Loring and Gerlach 2010). Yet
biocultural diversity is important both to the people whose
identity and self-worth is intertwined with the place-based
nature of their livelihoods (such as small-scale fishers), and
also in contributing to local and regional resilience and sus-
tainability (Maffi 2001; Turner et al. 2003; Cocks 2006;
Nabhan 2012; Leslie andMcCabe 2013). Thus, understanding
how bioculturally diverse groups of people can coexist despite
the potential for conflict is an important area for research.
Conflicts over shared resources can seem inevitable to the
people involved, but in many cases conflicts are essentially
fostered by aspects of resource governance (Nie 2003);
market-based regimes such as tradable fishing quotas, for ex-
ample, can favor industrialized modes of resource extraction
at the expense of traditional and artisanal systems: small-
holders are often driven out by larger competitors (McCay
1995; Carothers 2010), or forced to compete with one another
over what remains (Loring 2013; Jenkins 2015). Conversely,
there are numerous examples where people with diverse but
overlapping livelihood strategies coexist sustainably on
shared and resource-limited landscapes (Barth 1956; Braroe
1965; Bennett 1969; Harris 1974;Masuda et al. 1985; Kassam
2010). Understanding these cases, and developing a theory of
what makes them possible, would be significant steps towards
managing natural resource conflicts to ensure both environ-
mental sustainability and social justice (Loomis 2000; Maffi
2001; Redpath et al. 2013).
I explore these issues of conflict and coexistence in the case
of salmon fisheries in Alaska’s Upper Cook Inlet (UCI). I
draw on coexistence theory (CT) (Chesson 2000a, 2000b) as
a starting point for developing a theory of coexistence of
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diverse groups in a shared resource setting. I add three con-
cepts drawn from social science research on coexistence, spe-
cifically: adaptability, pluralism, and equity, and discuss some
of the challenges inherent to adapting natural science concepts
for use in anthropological contexts. I use this expanded theo-
retical framework, which I term social-ecological coexistence
theory (SCT), to tease apart the ongoing Bsalmon wars^ in
Alaska. SCT draws attention to many of the reasons why the
diverse fishing groups have coexisted in the UCI for decades,
but also to differences of resilience and inequity that currently
threaten this coexistence. Likewise, SCT aids in the identifi-
cation of possible solutions to the worsening conflict in the
UCI—specifically, ways to increase equity and resilience and
flexibility of stakeholder groups. I conclude by discussing
some of SCT’s potential complementarities with other areas
of sustainability science such as resilience thinking and com-
mons research.
Background
Why somuch diversity exists in the world and how competing
species come to coexist in space and time are founding ques-
tions of community ecology (Elton 1951; MacArthur 1955;
Hutchinson 1959). Biologically diverse systems are generally
more productive than less diverse ones (Tilman et al. 1996),
but diversity does not guarantee stability (De Angelis 1975;
Lawler and Morin 1993; Naeem 2002). Over time, dominant
species displace and exclude weaker species, and species’
niches become differentiated through adaptation and niche
construction processes (Odling-Smee et al. 1996). Yet, there
are also examples where groups of species with relatively
similar niches (i.e., guilds) coexist stably.
CT uses the principle of limited similarity, which states that
multiple species cannot coexist without an ability to exploit
sufficiently unique niches, to explain these examples of inter-
species coexistence (Macarthur and Levins 1967; Abrams
1983; Chesson 2000b). In cases of direct competition, coex-
istence is often achieved through spatial or temporal
partitioning of resources or habitat (Chesson 2000a;
Velázquez et al. 2014). Limited similarity is necessary but
not sufficient to achieving stable coexistence, however, be-
cause a species’ realized niche, the niche it currently occupies,
is not necessarily coterminous with its actual niche, the range
of conditions within which it can survive (Hutchinson 1965).
While two competing species may coexist effectively when
both populations are healthy, one species may displace the
second if it is weakened by a chance event. CT therefore also
posits two kind of coexistence, stable and unstable, i.e.,
whether there are factors that limit competition and foster
resilience in the case of a chance event such that the impacted
species is able to recover despite the presence of competitors.
CT also identifies two functional mechanisms by which
coexistence is achieved: stabilizing and equalizing mecha-
nisms. Stabilizing mechanisms are factors that prevent one
species from gaining an advantage over the second, for exam-
ple, density-dependent predation, where a predator switches
from targeting one prey species (A) to another (B) when the
population of the first declines (and vice versa). Equalizing
mechanisms reduce fitness differences among species. For
example, if prey species A is a better competitor than B, but
a predator has a stronger preference for A over B, the predator
will effectively equalize B’s disadvantage. Similarly if species
B has alternative food or habitat options, this also equalizes
the competitive differential in addition to providing resilience
to B in the case of a disturbance to its primary food source,
which as noted is also requisite to stable coexistence.
In sum, CT sets out the mechanisms by which similarities
in niche and competition among species are limited, such that:
1) none of the coexisting species will be displaced over time,
and 2) each remains resilient to chance events. If species differ
greatly in average fitness, then strong mechanisms are neces-
sary for them to coexist stably, and if fitness differences are
small, weaker and more indirect mechanisms are generally
sufficient to allow long-term coexistence (Chesson 2000a).
Coexistence in Social-Ecological Systems
Coexistence of cultural groups with diverse yet overlapping
niches is well documented in the social sciences (Barth 1956;
Bennett 1969;Masuda et al. 1985; Kassam 2010). This literature
offers some additional concepts to the present discussion, includ-
ing pluralism, adaptability, and equity, each of which enriches
CT’s usefulness in linked, social-ecological settings (Table 1).
Barth on Coexistence
Perhaps the most well-known study of coexistence in social-
ecological systems is Barth’s (1956) study of ecological relation-
ships among three ethnic groups in the Swat region of Pakistan.
His explanation for how the Pathans, sedentary agriculturalists
who live in the lower-altitude valley, theKohistanis, who practice
both agriculture and transhumant herding in higher-altitude re-
gions, and the Gujars, herders who live in both The Valley and
mountain regions, have come to coexist in a shared landscape
rests largely on the concepts of niche differentiation and compet-
itive displacement: the Pathans consider higher altitude environs
to be uninhabitable; theKohistanis, however, make a living in the
high latitude regions by complementing agriculture with herding.
Because the Pathans are stronger militarily, the Kohistanis refrain
from attempting to colonize The Valley. The third group, the
Gujars, are able to subsist in both the Pathan-occupied region
and the western-half of the Kohistani region through social flex-
ibility: in the former, they practice transhumant herding as serfs
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to the Pathans in a semi-mountainous region that the Pathans
control but consider useless. In the mountains, the Gujars are
fully nomadic herders in areas amendable to herding but
unsuited to Kohistani agriculture. Individual Gujars are also
flexible, and willing to move from one region and strategy
to the other.
Barth concludes that diverse groups can coexist pro-
vided they can sufficiently differentiate themselves from
each other and especially if they can forge some sort of
mutualistic economic or ecological relationship; other-
wise, he argues, conflict and displacement are inevita-
ble, with the ‘weaker’ parties eventually being forced to
either less desirable environs or eliminated altogether
(cf. Love 1977; Orlove 1980).
Adaptability
Bennett’s stated goal in Northern Plainsmen (1969) is to
explore relations among the Plains Cree, Hutterites,
wheat farmers, and cattle ranchers in an area of South-
west Saskatchewan that allow for Balternative ways of
functioning within the same general framework of natu-
ral and economic resources^ (p. 18). Rather than focus-
ing on niche in a deterministic sense, Bennett uses the
language of adaptation and what he calls the ‘adaptive
process’: how people adjust and experiment with their
adaptive strategies, and how these adjustments come to
be codified in practice over time. He describes a co-
evolutionary milieu among the farming and ranching
groups and notes that while relatively stable, the
Bregional culture has not yet found a balance between
cooperation and competition^ (p. 324).
Both Barth and Bennett highlight how coexistence is a
process, with innovation and adaptation often essential to
long-term stability (Bates 2004; Cumming and Collier 2005;
Loring 2007; Folke et al. 2010). As Bennett argues, not even
the most ‘traditional’ of societies are ever truly stable (Bennett
1976). Thus, behavioral or cultural change, or evenmovement
of some people from one group to another, should not be
mistaken for evidence that groups are not persisting and
coexisting. The critical determining factor is whether these
changes occur from within a context of self-determination
and agency, or whether they are forced by sociopolitical or
ecological circumstances.
Pluralism
People’s ability to rapidly adopt new strategies might also
serve to destabilize regional coexistence if a new strategy
changes the competitive balance. Social-ecological coexis-
tence hinges also on whether people value pluralism in their
communities (Kassam 2010). Indeed, Bennett noted the im-
portance of pluralism to coexistence in the social function of
rodeos as a shared cultural experience. More recently, Kassam
(2010) in his study of the various competing culture groups in
the Pamir Mountains of Afghanistan defines pluralism as the
product of social institutions through which people come to
value and even prioritize cultural diversity:
The case of the Kyrgyz and Wakhi or the Pashtu and
Shugni is informative because their milieu is rife with
conflict, yet their approach is pragmatic as they negoti-
ate human-ecological relations that help secure their
livelihoods through the practice of pluralism. The inter-
dependence between the Kyrgyz and Wakhi or the
Table 1 Proposed principles of social-ecological coexistence theory
Principle Description Noteworthy Citations
Limited Similarity Niche differentiation, for example commercial fishers targeting different species
than sport fisheries
(Barth 1956; Hardin 1960; Macarthur
and Levins 1967; Abrams 1983)
Limited Competition Stabilizing and equalizing mechanisms (below) limit competition such that groups
are not displaced and are able to recover if impacted by some external factor.
(Paine 1966; Quinn 1991; Peteraf 1993)
Stabilizing
Mechanism
Prevents one group from gaining or exploiting a competitive advantage over
others, for example policies that limit growth of any specific sector




Reduces competitive advantage, for example policies that limit downstream
fishing to ensure passage to upstream users
(Chesson 2000a)
Resilience An equalizing mechanism that is essential for stable coexistence because it keeps
a group from being displaced if temporarily impacted by a chance event.
(Holling 1973; Pimm 1984; Folke et al.
2010)
Adaptability Whether people have the flexibility to experiment and innovate. (Bennett 1969; Moran 1979;
Bates 2004; Folke et al. 2010)
Pluralism People value biocultural diversity, and this serves as a stabilizing and/or equalizing
mechanism.
(Kassam 2010; Karner and Parker 2011)
Equity An equalizing mechanism, where social mores and institutions ensure equitable
outcomes and preclude competitive displacement.
(Sen 1983; Lam and Pitcher 2012)
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Pashtu and Shugni is ….. not only an outcome of a
materially determined calculus, but an organic engage-
ment of diverse cultural systems and social structures in
the context of varied but overlapping ecological zones.
Trust and confidence sustain this interdependence
(p.14).
Pluralism, where held and practiced as a cultural value,
thus represents a special kind of equalizing mechanism
through which competition among groups is limited because
each group accepts and values the others’ right to exist within
the same ecological space. Pluralism is especially relevant for
social-ecological systems because unlike most other species
(though there are some exceptions), humans are known to
systematically eliminate some or even all of their competitors,
i.e., wage war (Vayda 1976; Quinn 1991). The near-
extirpation of coyotes and wolves in the US is one example;
the forced displacement of Native Americans is another. Such
actions are ideological, and pluralism as a cultural value is
antithetical to this ideology of competition through
extirpation.
Equity
It is generally recognized that equity is an essential prerequi-
site to the coexistence of diverse social groups; inequity is
widely understood to be a cause of conflict and unsustainable
behavior (Sen 1983; Nayak et al. 2014); when social institu-
tions attend to equity in how resources are managed, those
resources are more sustainable: users are more compliant with
rules, have greater trust in management regimes, and have less
reason to view competing sectors as a threat (Bennett et al.
2001; Bundy et al. 2008; Lam and Pitcher 2012). For
ecosystem-based management to be considered equitable,
they must go further than simply managing a resource for
some targeted yield and work toward such goals as recogniz-
ing the intrinsic value of non-human aspects of ecosystems
and restoring and preserving ecosystem integrity and resil-
ience (Chapin et al. 2011; Lam and Pitcher 2012).
In sum, I propose a theoretical framework for social-
ecological coexistence summarized as follows: groups of peo-
ple with competing interests in a shared ecosystem can coexist
sustainably if direct competition is limited, and if competitive
advantage is equalized (Table 1). As in non-human ecological
communities, this involves both practical aspects of each
group’s niche such as how, when, and where they harvest or
otherwise enjoy shared resources; however, sociocultural in-
stitutions and values can also serve to limit competition and
competitive advantage even in cases where the groups’ niches
overlap, specifically whether the people involved value cul-
tural pluralism, whether formal and informal social institu-
tions ensure equity, and if people have the flexibility to adapt
in the face of change.
Words of Caution
It is important to note some of the challenges inherent to adapting
concepts developed in the natural sciences for use in social
science (Rhoades 1978). CT in community ecology is a highly
mathematical and reductionist enterprise, which can be a concern
given that social institutions and human agency defy reduction or
transferability because they are deeply embedded in place, histo-
ry, and culture (Friedman 1974; Cleaver 2002). For example,
some set of local traditions or policies may provide resilience
in one part of the world but drive conflict in another, depending
on local cultural and political histories (Davidson 2010). Deter-
ministic overtones are also of concern because natural science
frameworks are not necessarily constructed with agency in mind.
CT also generally focuses on interspecies dynamics, which may
not always be directly analogous to dynamics among human
groups or communities of practice.
Thus, the appropriateness of the ecological analogy must
be evident and justified (Binford 2001). For this research, I
argue that interspecies competition is sufficiently analogous to
competition among fishing groups to justify the framework’s
analytical power. Firstly, fishers in general and these fishers
specifically are greatly attached to and invested in fishing as a
lifestyle (Pollnac et al. 2001; Pollnac et al. 2006; Harrison
2013; Britton and Coulthard 2013). Likewise, in many places
it is not easy for fishers to change how or where they fish,
whether because of policy barriers to entering new fisheries or
economic circumstances that keep them locked-in to their cur-
rent ones (Cinner et al. 2009; Carothers et al. 2010).
The Case Study
Upper Cook Inlet (UCI) and the Kenai Peninsula, which
bounds the Inlet on its eastern side, are known for their pro-
ductive salmon fisheries, which involve all five species of
Pacific salmon and support multiple commercial fishing
fleets, an international sport fishery (including a large charter
fishing sector), and personal use and subsistence fisheries
open only to Alaskans. Commercial fishing (Fig. 1a, b) is
the largest of the sectors in the region, and accounts for rough-
ly 5 % of the total annual catch of salmon in Alaska (Shields
andDupuis 2013). Two distinct commercial fleets are active in
the UCI: a Bdrift^ fleet and a Bset-net^ fleet, both fish with gill
nets and are managed as limited entry with tradable permits.
Commercial fishing operations in the UCI are primarily a
family affair run by in-state residents, many of whom live on
the Kenai Peninsula, and it is not uncommon to find members
from multiple generations of the same family fishing together
(Harrison and Loring 2014).
Sport fishing (Fig. 1c) in the Kenai Peninsula is open ac-
cess and popular. Many Alaskans rely on sport salmon fisher-
ies for food, and guided sport fishing charters are big business,
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with the Kenai Peninsula and the Kenai River in particular
widely regarded as a world-class sport fishing destination.
According to industry data, visitors to the Kenai River account
for over 1/3 of the total tourist anglers that visit Alaska (KRSA
2008). Many charter operators are state residents, but there is
also a large contingent of summer workers from outside the
state that work for local charter companies. The third sector,
personal use Bdip-net^ fishing (Fig. 1d), is a food fishery that is
open only to Alaska residents. Dip-net fisheries were intro-
duced by the state in 1996 to replace amore disparate collection
of personal use and subsistence practices and are immensely
popular: for a short few weeks in July, Alaskans flock to the
beaches of the Kenai and Kasilof Rivers to fish their limit,
which is 25 fish for a single adult. For most Alaskans and
especially those living in the Kenai Peninsula, dip-netting and
sport fishing are the principle methods for procuring salmon for
consumption, as local seafood is not sold in local grocery stores
(Loring et al. 2012). Many locals also obtain seafood through
barter or as gifts directly from commercial fishers (ibid).
Each of the three fishing groups also has their own respec-
tive non-profit trade associations: commercial drift fishers are
generally members of the United Cook Inlet Drift Association,
set-netters are members of the Kenai Peninsula Fishermen’s
Association, the Kenai River Sportfishing Association and the
Kenai River Professional Guides association advocate for
sport fishing, and at the time of my previous research a dip-
net association was being formed. These groups are actively
engaged in political debates over local conflicts, and are illus-
trative of how dedicated these fishers are to their respective
fishing practices and ways of life.
In 2013 the commercial catch was roughly 4 million fish,
whereas sport and personal use fisheries on the Kenai River
both caught between 400,000 and 500,000 (Shields and
Dupuis 2013). There are also a handful of smaller, so-called
‘educational’ subsistence fisheries throughout the region,
though these are not party to the conflicts discussed below.
UCI salmon fisheries are notorious for long-standing and
often rancorous conflict, specifically among commercial fish-
ermen and sport fishermen (particularly those who run charter
operations). At the crux of this conflict is a debate over how
salmon catches should be allocated. Sport fishing advocates
argue that in-river angling and the tourism that it supports
brings more money to the region per fish caught than does
commercial fishing, so that king salmon should be allocated
for sport while commercial fleets should focus on sockeye
salmon (Mayor’s Blue Ribbon Sportsmen Committee’s
2011). Though not the primary fished species for either sector,
king salmon is the iconic and most sought after ‘trophy’ fish
for sport anglers, and some sport boosters describe the catch of
king salmon by commercial fishers as Bbycatch^ even though
commercial fishing permits allow them to take all five species.
Commercial fishers, conversely, hold that they have as much
right to catch king salmon as sport fishers, regardless of which
sector makes more money with the fish. They also contest the
notion that the charter industry brings more economic benefits
to the region than they do.
This conflict has remained non-violent over the last few
decades, playing out primarily in policy debates and in the
public sphere, but it has become troublingly acrimonious in
the last few years (Harrison and Loring 2014). People openly
Fig. 1 Salmon Fisheries of the
Upper Cook Inlet and Kenai
Peninsula. Examples of the
competing fisheries in the region:
a commercial drift fishing, b
commercial set-net fishing, c
sport-angling, d personal use dip-
netting. Images originally pub-
lished in (Loring et al. 2013). All
photos by Philip Loring
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dehumanize each other, there have been allegations of illegal
spying, and most recently, sport sector advocates are actively
pursuing legislation to eliminate the set-net fishery altogether.
Some level of conflict among the sectors is perhaps not sur-
prising, given the serial nature of these fisheries, and many
locals reported not remembering a time when they did not
fight over fish (Harrison and Loring 2014). Likewise, the var-
ious fisheries have ostensibly coexisted in the region for de-
cades, even with sport and personal use fisheries growing
significantly over the last 20 years (Fig. 3a, b). However,
recent years of low king salmon abundance and a closure of
both sport and set-net fishing in 2012 seem to have tipped this
balance, driving a noteworthy escalation to the conflict and
bringing into question whether or not these groups can con-
tinue to coexist.
I first provide additional data on the salmon fisheries drawn
from previous ethnographic research in the region (Harrison
2013; Loring and Harrison 2013; Loring et al. 2013, 2014;
Harrison and Loring 2014). I present an analysis of catch data
(Shields and Dupuis 2013, 2014), focusing on limited similar-
ity among the fisheries, the presence of any stabilizing or
equalizing mechanisms, whether fishing sectors are resilient
and adaptable, and whether the fisheries are managed in a
cultural context where pluralism is valued and equity
protected.
Limited Similarity
The fisheries vary notably in terms of the gear and fishing
methods employed (Fig. 1a-d) and the locations where harvest
occurs (Fig. 2). However, because these fisheries occur in
serial, there is the possibility that a downstream group will
create a bottleneck that reduces the success of upstream fish-
ers, and this is ostensibly at the crux of the conflict. The
existing management system currently works to avoid this
problem; generally, fishing openings and closures are used
to ensure escapement of sufficient salmon to spawning
grounds, but strategic closures are also used to ensuring that
up-stream groups have access to fish by limiting downstream
commercial fishing opportunities. Commercial fisheries are
never opened on Fridays, for example, to allow more fish into
the river system on the weekends when anglers are most ac-
tive. Current management plans also limit commercial fishing
for pink salmon in August and include spatially strategic clo-
sures called Bconservation corridors^ to ensure passage of
salmon to rivers and anglers further north.
The recent growth of sport and personal use fisheries (Fig.
3) would suggest that the spatial differences (Fig. 2) in com-
bination with strategic closures have, at least historically, been
sufficient for limiting the similarity of these fisheries. This is
further evidenced by rapid growth of the dip-net fishery fol-
lowing its inception, from roughly 100,000 fish caught in
1996 to over 500,000 in both 2012 and 2013 and without
any obvious impact on the catch in other sectors.
Yet, it is also possible that the current abundance of
sockeye in the UCI functions as an equalizing mechanism,
improving everyone’s access regardless of how, when, or
where they fish. Sport interests have long argued for more
explicit partitioning of the various fisheries: that sockeye,
pink, and chum salmon should be managed for commercial
uses while king and coho salmon should be managed for sport
fisheries (Mayor’s Blue Ribbon Sportsmen Committee’s
2011). Nevertheless, only now that king salmon runs are see-
ing notable declines has the conflict reached a point where the
sport sector is calling for complete elimination of set-netting
in the Inlet.
Additional Equalizing Mechanisms
State of Alaska law requires equal access to natural resources
for all Alaska residents; the state constitution requires that
resources be managed to Bthe maximum use consistent with
public interest^ (§1), Bfor the maximum benefit of [all
Alaskans]^ (§2), and the Alaska Subsistence Law (1978) es-
tablishes subsistence uses of fish and game as the highest
priority save sustainability. In theory, these pieces of legisla-
tion serve as an equalizing mechanism by ensuring that
Alaskans will never be displaced from fisheries by corporate
interests. In addition, fisheries in the UCI are managed
through a two-tiered system: the state’s Board of Fish (BoF)
addresses political decisions such as allocation of catches
among groups, and the Alaska Department of Fish and Game
(ADF&G) addresses scientific issues, such as identification of
sustainable yield and escapement targets (ADF&G 2009). The
BoF is made up of seven political appointees who make deci-
sions by simple majority. Because of the odd number of mem-
bers, there is a likelihood that one sector will have more in-
fluence than another, meaning that the BoF can serve as an
equalizing mechanism among the fishing groups, at least with
respect to how each are prioritized through management ac-
tions. In recent years, for example, the BoF has had stronger
representation for sport fishing interests, which some sport
fishers argue is essential as they perceive themselves to be a
political underdog by comparison to commercial fisheries
(Mayor’s Blue Ribbon Sportsmen Committee’s 2011). Some
commercial fishers argue the opposite, however, that a BoF
composition that favors sport fishing institutionalizes compet-
itive disadvantage for their sector (Harrison 2013).
Resilience and Adaptability
As previously noted, resilience and adaptability can provide
important equalizing mechanisms in scenarios where different
livelihood groups compete for resources. UCI commercial
fisheries and drift fishers in particular demonstrated resilience
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to closures caused by the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (EVOS) in
1989. Drift fleets were closed for the entire season as a pre-
cautionary measure, but east side set-netters were allowed to
fish and ended up logging their highest year on record. This
created some short-lived animosity between the two commer-
cial fishing groups but the fish processing plants kept operat-
ing and the UCI commercial fishery as a whole emerged from
the spill relatively unscathed. The drift fleet also recovered
immediately from the closure, logging an average catch the
very next year and then logging its highest catch on record in
1992 (Fig. 3). Exactly how drift fishers were impacted by the
closure is unclear; many drift fishers hold other occupations
outside of the fishing season, and this livelihood diversifica-
tion likely contributed to their resilience.
As already noted, both sport and east side set-net fisheries
experienced closures in 2012 because of low king salmon
abundance. East side set-net fishers had one day of fishing
before being closed for the season, and sport fisheries in the
Kenai River were first limited with restrictions on bait, and
then closed completely for two weeks to allow kings passage
to spawning grounds. Catch data for these fisheries (Fig. 3)
show that set-net fisheries were clearly impacted, and they
have yet to return to previous levels of productivity, logging
below average years in 2013 and 2014. Sport fisheries do not
Fig. 2 Geographic ranges of
Upper Cook Inlet salmon
fisheries. The fisheries of the UCI
are serial in nature, which can
foster conflict among users but
also provides some limited
similarity among the groups. Drift
fishers have the widest range and
flexibility, though fishing is
sometimes restricted to the
Bcorridor^ to allow passage of
fish to rivers further north
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appear to have been similarly affected by the 2012 closure;
they logged above average years in both 2012 and 2013 (the
most recent year for which there is public data).
This difference in how the impacts of the 2012 closures
were experienced is indicative of differences in resilience
and adaptability among fishers of the two fisheries. Catch
diversity, for example, is one source of resilience and adapt-
ability for fishers: fishers who focus on fewer species or use
highly selective gear tend to be more impacted by and less
adaptable to environmental changes (Hamilton et al. 2003;
Nesbitt 2014). In the UCI, catch diversity has declined for
all sectors over the last 20 years, but the east side set-net
fishery is the least diverse of the three (Fig. 4a). The drop in
catch diversity for the set-net fishery is a result, in part, of
management actions limiting commercial fishing for pink
and coho salmon to ensure passage to rivers further north
(Shields and Dupuis 2013). Pink salmon are an important
secondary catch for east side set-netters, in part because they
peak later in the summer than do king and sockeye runs,
though their runs are strong only every other year. Some set-
netters did fish for pinks late in 2012 to offset the impacts of
the closures (Fig. 4b), but these limited opportunities were not
enough to keep the set-net fishery from logging a catch 82 %
below average that year.
The observed decline in catch diversity in the sport fishery,
however, is likely not a sign of reduced resilience because it
was driven by an increase in sockeye harvests rather than a
decline in the total number of species fished. Sport fishers can
target species such as rainbow trout, smelt, and grayling, and
managers also have options such as Bcatch and release^ and
bait limitations that can be enacted on the sport fishery prior to
outright closures.
Finally, because commercial salmon fisheries are
managed as limited access, set-net fishers are both re-
stricted to, and financially invested in, highly special-
ized gear and fixed fishing locations. They cannot eas-
ily adapt to changing ecological conditions by fishing
elsewhere or modifying their gear or by entering other
commercial fisheries, except at great financial costs.
Drift fishing permits and the associated equipment cur-
rently sell for over $USD 200,000, whereas set-net
permits and equipment sell for an order of magnitude




























































































































Fig. 3 Comparison of catch data for Upper Cook Inlet salmon fisheries.
Catch data, standardized, shows relative stability of each fishery over
time. It also illustrates year to year variability, and the impacts of key
events such as EVOS on the drift fishery in 1989 and the closure of set-net
fisheries in 2012
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Fig. 4 Catch diversity in Upper Cook Inlet fisheries. a The effective
number of species fished by each fishery, calculated using the Shannon
Index (see methods). The set-net fishery shows the greatest decline over
time, currently fishing only 1.5 effective species (sockeye salmon, and
pink salmon every other year). b Catch composition in the east side set-
net fishery showsmore detail on the decline in catch diversity and the role
that pink played for some fishers in 2012
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Pluralism and Equity
It is reasonable to infer from the high profile and rancorous
nature of conflict in the UCI that pluralism is not the most
highly touted value among fishers in the region. However,
previous research suggests that the community is not as divid-
ed with respect to their values as the ongoing conflict would
appear to indicate. A survey of Kenai River dip-netters from
around the state shows that a majority believe that there are
enough fish to go around and that all of the different fishing
groups have a right to fish in the region (Harrison 2013). This
research also shows that local residents from all fishing sectors
share a core set of priorities about how local salmon fisheries
should be managed that include ecosystem and community
sustainability and the maintenance of local fishing traditions
and culture (Loring et al. 2014). Nevertheless, conflicts in the
region have escalated to the point where sport-fishing interests
are actively seeking the outright elimination of the east side
set-net fishery, and many people are so entrenched in what has
become an ideological war over fish that they regularly ste-
reotype and dehumanize one another (Harrison and Loring
2014).
Underlying issues of equity are likely to blame when con-
flicts escalate to the point where people are willing to take
actions that threatens others’ livelihoods (Harrison and
Loring 2014). That is, people escalate their own strategies
commensurately and to the detriment of others only if they
believe that their basic rights are not protected or that the
governance system is inherently unfair. In the UCI, both sport
anglers and set-netters perceive the system as being stacked
against them, with both contending that the other has more
political sway and that their right to harvest salmon is being
threatened. Sport anglers worry that commercial fishing inter-
feres with their right to fish and also threatens the long-term
sustainability of the fisheries, while set-netters contend that
they bear an unfair proportion of the costs of management
and conservation, and also worry that the sport fisheries, in
fact, are threatening the sustainability of king salmon runs
through overharvests and undocumented impacts of catch
and release fishing. The example of an apparent loss of resil-
ience within the set-net fishery as a result of management
actions does support their contention that the impacts of con-
servation decisions are unequally distributed.
The question of equity in UCI fisheries can also be ex-
plored using catch data (Fig. 5). A GINI index for the fisher-
ies, which provides one measure of equity (Voss et al. 2014),
shows that while catches have remained relatively equitable
over time, inequity doubled in 2012 due to the closures. Sim-
ilarly, a simple comparison of the number of king salmon
caught by east side set-netters and by sport anglers in the
Kenai River further suggests that the set-net fishery is indeed
bearing an unfair proportion of the conservation costs (Fig.
5b): since 1996, sport anglers in the Kenai River harvested
more king salmon than east side set-netters in all but three
years: 2004, 2011, and 2013. On average, the ratio of kings
caught each year by set-netters to sport anglers is 0.79. In
addition, not every king salmon caught in east side set-nets
is bound for the Kenai River (Willette et al. 2015). Thus,
there is no apparent ecological basis for the east side set-net
fishery to be singled out over sport fishing as the primary
conservation concern for Kenai River kings, though it con-
tinues to bear this reputation in local media (Medred 2013;
Caldwell 2015).
Discussion
The analysis above highlights the various ecological and in-
stitutional aspects of UCI fisheries that have fostered the co-
existence of sport, commercial, and personal use groups in the
region. However, recent declines in king salmon and the es-
calation of local conflicts make it clear that this coexistence is
not stable but bolstered in the past by the sheer abundance of
salmon. All three fishing groupsmake important contributions
to the region, economic and otherwise (Knapp 2012; Harrison
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Kenai River Sport East-Side Set-net
a
b
Fig. 5 Inequity among fisheries. a The increase of inequity, calculated
using a GINI index in 2012 is statistically significantly different from the
mean. b A comparison of the number of king salmon caught by the east
side set-net fishery and Kenai River sport anglers
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fishing would arguably do more harm than good in terms of
regional resilience and community well-being. However, as
long as locals are mired in this intense conflict and feel that
their livelihoods are threatened, it is unlikely that they will
come to collectively recognize the value of this biocultural
diversity to their communities. That is not to say that conflict
need be eliminated outright; conflict can be an important as-
pect of group maintenance and can be essential for achieving
ethical and sustainable outcomes (Spicer 1971; Ominayak and
Thomas 2009; Banerjee 2012). Still, conflict can become a
pathology that hinders a community’s collective ability to
solve emerging problems in an equitable manner (Harrison
and Loring 2014).
The question that emerges, then, is what policy actions
could enable these various fishing groups to better coexist
and cooperate on solving these issues. The analysis above
points to multiple options: first, modifications to set-nets
may be a way to reduce competition between sport and set-
net fisheries, as limited research has shown that king salmon
swim deeper than sockeye (Welch et al. 2014; but see Willette
et al. 2015).While arguably a moremoderate solution than the
outright ban on set-nets that some have proposed, this solution
would leave unaddressed the question of whether set-net fish-
ers have equal right to fish for king salmon. Likewise, there is
presently no scientific basis to suggest that the set-net fishery
more than the in-river fishery is responsible for recent de-
clines, so targeting the set-net fishery alone is hard to justify.
Thirdly, the change in gear would likely further reduce the
resilience of the set-net fishery, so this solution would have
to be weighed against any risks that the change would create
for set-netters in the future.
A second option is to find ways to improve the set-net
fishery’s resilience to closures driven by concerns for king
salmon. Specifically, this could be achieved by making
management changes that increase the fishery’s catch
diversity, for example by allowing more fishing time
for pink salmon later in the summer. Pink salmon runs
are only fishable every other year, but runs peak at the
tail end of king and sockeye season, meaning that stra-
tegic fishing in August could improve the set-net catch
with minimal impact on king runs (unless the timing of
king salmon runs changes to later in the year as well).
On average, the price currently paid for pink salmon is
just one quarter that for sockeye, but this is an improve-
ment in recent years that makes the pink runs at least
commercially viable. Again, this solution would not ad-
dress the rights-based issues that arguably underlie the
conflict, but it would mitigate the impacts of conservation-
driven closures on set-net families if and when they are
necessary.
It is also arguably beholden on the state to better ensure
equity in management and to protect the rights of all involved.
As noted above, there is no scientific basis to single out set-
nets over in-river anglers, and a case could be made for more
long-term in-river restrictions, given that in-river fishing gen-
erally catches more kings than the set-net fishery. The pro-
posed set-net ban would instead re-allocate king salmon to
sport fisheries based only on the notion that sport fishers
should have more right to the fish because they generate more
profit. Recently, the Alaska State Superior Court failed to
ensure equity for the set-net contingent, arguing that the state
is bound only to protect commercial fishing as a single sector.
In the judge’s words, Bset netters are not a ‘user group’ any
more so than sport fishers using fly rods are a distinct user
group from those using spinning rods^ (Easter 2014: 5). This
finding, while congruent with state law (Alaska Statute
16.05.251), is factually inaccurate because as noted above
these and most of Alaska’s various commercial fisheries are
managed as limited entry, meaning that the set-net fishers
displaced by the ban could not easily adapt by adopting new
gear and targeting new species. Barring a change to how fish-
eries are governed, the ban would effectively close set-net
families out of commercial salmon fishing in the region
entirely.
Conclusion
If fostering bioculturally diverse communities is a societal
goal, and there are strong scientific and ethical arguments
for it to be (Maffi 2001; Turner et al. 2003; Kassam 2010;
Leslie and McCabe 2013), an essential research question is
whether discernable patterns of social, ecological, and eco-
nomic circumstances can be identified that consistently allow
for diverse groups of stakeholders with interests in shared
resources to coexist (Ostrom and Cox 2010). In community
ecology, CT provides a set of concepts that begin to address
these questions. With some additions drawn from the social
sciences, I have implemented here a prototype version of CT
with social-ecological systems.
Many existing frameworks and theories for understanding
conflicts focus on individual behavior and the material and
economic aspects of the conflict, for example game theory
or the typology of conflict suggested by Charles (1992; see
alsoMcClanahan et al. 2013). Yet, conflicts are often complex
emergent phenomena that defy such typologies and often tran-
scend the specifics observed in individual disputes (Harrison
and Loring 2014). As I illustrate above, SCTas proposed here
draws focus to functional relationships at the system level, and
the UCI case study shows that SCT is informative, at very
least, as a heuristic for diagnosing the ecological and institu-
tional dimensions of conflict in a shared landscape or
seascape.
The discussion above also illustrates how SCTcan inform a
policy framework for pursuing sustainable and just outcomes
in a contested setting. SCT holds that groups will only achieve
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stable coexistence if the similarity of their niches are suffi-
ciently differentiated, and, perhaps more importantly, if com-
petition among groups is limited such that no one group is
capable of or willing to eliminate another. Resilience, adapt-
ability, equity, and pluralism are all outcomes that can be
actively fostered either by individuals or governing institu-
tions, but a persistent challenge with putting concepts like
resilience into practice is that they require an explicit norma-
tive plan (Lélé and Norgaard 1996; Brand and Jax 2007).
Many undesirable systems are highly resilient, and in social
systems, resilience can often come at significant social cost
(Oliver-Smith 2013). Coexistence and biocultural diversity
provide a compelling normative strategy for building social
resilience, providing an answer, in other words, to the persis-
tent question, Bresilience of what^ (Carpenter et al. 2001)?
As discussed earlier, one must be cautious when applying
natural science concepts to social systems. Even where anal-
ogies are warranted, their limits must be understood. SCT as
set out here offers concepts for mapping the ecological and
institutional dimensions of intergroup dynamics, specifically
as they relate to scenarios of conflict over shared resources. It
does not purport to explain the behavior of actors in these
scenarios or how these social-ecological systems came to be
in the situations that they are in. Finally, it does not attend to
mutualistic rather than competitive scenarios, though this
would be a fruitful area for future research and development
of the theory.
These caveats notwithstanding, the case study above shows
that SCT holds promise for helping us learn about what con-
ditions are necessary for effective coexistence among other-
wise competing groups of people. Future research could ex-
plore how SCT might be used in tandem with existing frame-
works for the analysis of common pool resource systems (e.g.,
Ostrom 2009; Cox 2011). These frameworks, such as
Ostrom’s (2007) Social Ecological Systems (SES) framework,
have proved powerful for amassing detailed empirical data on
the social and ecological features of resource systems from
around the world (Cox 2014). Understanding how the com-
ponents of these systems interact is a theoretical question, and
one that Ostrom and Cox (2010) argue is a next step for com-
mons research. SCT could inform compelling hypotheses for
why patterns such as sustainability and coexistence or non-
compliance and overharvest emerge from the bricolage of
social institutions, ecological circumstances, and social and
ecological histories that sustainability researchers invariably
encounter.
Data Analysis Methods
Standardized catch for all UCI fisheries is calculated by diving
the annual total catch (in number of fish) by the average of
totals for all years on record.
Catch diversity is calculated as the effective number of





where S is the number of species caught and p is the ratio of
catch per species to the total catch in a given year. For com-
mercial fisheries, a 5 year average was used in order to ac-
count for the two-year periodicity of pink salmon returns. This
mutes the signal of inter-annual variability in favor of illus-
trating longer trends.
Change in catch for the set-net fishery is shown as propor-
tion of value contributed by species, corrected to 2014 USD.
Landings value is calculated using the average prices paid and
average species weights listed in Shields and Dupuis (2014,
their Appendix B11 and B12).
The GINI index is calculated for each year since 1996 with
the following formula,











where x is standardized catch for each fishery in a given
year ordered from least to greatest.
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